At the time when representative government was established,
medieval tradition and modern natural right theories converged to
make the consent and will of the governed the sole source of
political legitimacy and obligation. In such a situation, election
suggested itself as the obvious method for conferring power. At the
same time, however, the question of legitimacy very much obscured
(or at least relegated to the background) the problem of distributive
justice in the allocation of political functions. Henceforth, it no
longer mattered whether public offices were distributed equally
among citizens. It was much more important that those who held
office did so through the consent of the rest. It was the manner in
which power was distributed that made the outcome acceptable,
whatever it was. To be sure, the concern for distributive justice in
the allocation of offices had not entirely disappeared. But election as
a method for conferring power was seen as substantially fairer and
more egalitarian than the principle that had been in place, namely,
that of heredity. Compared to the gap that separated election and
heredity, the difference between the distributive effects of the two
non-hereditary procedures (lot and election) appeared negligible.
Since in other respects the notion of legitimacy gave clear preference
to one of the two non-hereditary methods, it is understandable that
even the most egalitarian revolutionaries never seriously contemplated
introducing lot. The difference between the respective distributive
effects of lot and election was something that educated
leaders, whether conservative or radical, were certainly aware of.
Yet it failed to arouse controversy because conservatives were
(secretly or not so secretly) quite happy about it, and radicals were
too attached to the principle of consent to defend lot.