The Logics of Public Diplomacy
If public diplomacy is as ineffective as most evidence suggests, then why are Asian states increasingly investing in this practice? How has this practice acquired an “almost magical attractive quality,” as some analysts have observed? Several different motives appear to be at play some animated by the “logic of consequences” and some that embody the “logic of appropriateness.” First, some states pursue public diplomacy because their leaders believe that it actually works and thus has “strategic value” (i.e., it is consequential). Second, some engage in the struggle for soft power because they observe others doing it (i.e., it has become the “norm” and therefore appropriate). Policymakers may even invest in public diplomacy because they believe it will have a transformative effect on Asian international relations, opening up hitherto closed processes to public scrutiny and democratizing foreign policy. This motive also has an inherent “logic of appropriateness,” but one that sees the “norm” as an ideal or aspiration, rather than just a common pattern of behavior. These motives are conceptually distinct but not mutually exclusive. For example, it is possible to believe that public diplomacy works to advance a state’s interests and yet deny that it improves international relations. Equally, it is possible to believe that public diplomacy works and is a positive force within the region.