Relative performance (or relative improvement) contracts essentially reward managers for
how their business units perform relative to some appropriate benchmark performance, not
a fixed budget target. For example, an operating unit or division might be evaluated on the
basis of its return on investment (ROI) for a period relative to the market or to best-in-class performance. Some organizations benchmark actual performance to the top quartile of their peer group. This change in incentive, at least conceptually, avoids much of the dysfunctional consequences associated with traditional budgeting systems. Units and managers are motivated to achieve to their highest level because their compensation/reward is tied to how they
performed relative to a prespecified (external or internal) benchmark. In essence, this represents radical decentralization and significant reliance on self-regulation. Employees and operating managers in this model are vested with significant decision authority and are asked to use their own best judgment to achieve superior results, without being constrained by the plan embodied in a budget.