InternationaL legal Theory:C IL May Affect Behavior
The discussion in parts II and III, coupled with the model described in part V and in the
appendix, suggests that there is a significant set of cases in which CIL will affect behavior. Since
we cannot here assess the actual value of cooperation to states, or their discount rates, or many
of the other factors included in the model, it is impossible to say with certainty how often, or
by how much, CIL affects behavior. But it is equally impossible to say that it does not affect
behavior, that it seldom does so, or even that it has only marginal effects. We therefore believe
that CIL is plausible.
CIL seems no less plausible than social norms in the domestic context. In fact, there are reasons
to believe that it may be more plausible-based on economies of scale and scope in the
production and distribution of information, and on multisector contact. There are also countervailing
factors, however, including the possibility that governments acting in international
society may have less sense of permanence and stability than individuals in intrastate contexts
or communities-which may make the latter more patient and consequently more likely to adopt
and maintain social norms. Interestingly, this analysis suggests that states generally have an
interest in the development of domestic political institutions that will instill "patience" in other
states. Patience may be associated with accountability, which constrains governments to be
responsive to the long-term interests of constituents.