Before examining the compatibility of the Accession Agreement with Union law, the CJEU elaborated on various preliminary considerations which would prove crucial for its subsequent arguments. First there was a glimmer of hope when the Court remarked that the original obstacle to accession – the lack of competence, as considered in Opinion 2/94 – had been removed by Article 6(2) TEU which now represents a specific legal basis for accession.
It then immediately interjected, however, that accession would nonetheless be characterized by significant distinctive features, most prominently the fact – as the CJEU explicitly asserted for the first time! – that the EU could not be considered a State under international law. Since the EU Treaties established a new legal order with its own constitutional framework, a sophisticated institutional structure, and concepts such as supremacy and direct effect,EU accession to the ECHR may have consequences on this system. As several ‘anxiety clauses’ in the Treaties prove, one of the main concerns surrounding accession is that it could change or affect
the division of competences between the Union and its Member States, which are linked with each other through mutually interdependent legal relations. These relations are shaped by a set of common values and fundamental
rights, thus ensuring the mutual trust between the Member States that these values and fundamental rights are being protected. The CJEU argued that such protection could only be guaranteed within the framework of the structure and objectives of the EU whose legal autonomy was maintained by the interlocking judicial system of the Court itself and the national courts. The keystone of this system was the preliminary ruling procedure (Article 267 TFEU) which secures the uniform interpretation and application of Union law, including EU fundamental rights, through a judicial dialogue between the CJEU and the national courts.