Second, Lim (1998) and Das et al.(1998) argue that analysts might
issue optimistic forecasts to gain increased access to information from
management, especially in cases where the information asymmetry between
the management and the investment community is high.Anal ysts’ investment
in developing better relations with firms’ management improves the flow of
information from managers as well as helps obtain more investment banking
and brokerage business, and potentially more brokerage commissions from
clients.Lim (1998) and Das et al. (1998) recognize that forecast bias is bad, but
management might reward optimism by funneling information to the analyst.
This information is helpful in improving forecast accuracy.The benefit to
analysts is greatest when prior uncertainty is high.So analysts trade-off bias
against information from management, which reduces the variance of the
forecast error.This leads to an interior equilibrium, rather than a corner
solution of huge optimistic bias.51 The hypothesis also generates a crosssectional
prediction that the bias would be increasing in variables that proxy
for prior uncertainty and information asymmetry (e.g., firm size, and growth
opportunities).Evidence in Lim (1998) and Das et al. (1998) is consistent with
the hypothesis.