Gunther and Moore (2003) use a sample of 25,514 end-of-year call reports from the US commercial banks for the period 1996-1998, that contains both originally-reported and subsequently-revised financial variables, to study accounting restatements. Their results indicate that the worse a bank’s financial condition, the more likely it is for originally-reported data to understate financial losses. Furthermore, they report that external auditors also prompt upward revisions to provision expenses. The study of Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) focuses on the role of accounting and auditing systems on bank risk-taking. Using a sample of 275 publicly traded banks from 29 countries, they find that accounting and auditing systems are effective in counteracting the risk shifting of bank safety nets after controlling for regulatory and official supervisory devices (i.e. restrictions on banking activities, minimum regulatory capital requirements, and official discipline). The effectiveness of these systems in controlling bank-risk, decreases with bank charter value, but increases with the moral hazard originated by the deposit insurance scheme in the country. They also report that accounting and auditing systems are complements to minimum capital requirements, but substitutes for restrictions on bank activities and official discipline.