Basically, Hegel is able to sum up his objections to the optional model of self-determination in the single formula that here the material of a reflective decision of the will must continue to be regarded as contingent and in that sense as “heteronomous”: as he puts it in his own terminology, “the content of this selfdetermination” therefore remains something essentially “finite” (§ 15). Thus, while the limitation of the negativistic model of “free will,” in Hegel’s view, consisted in its ability to describe self-determination only as the exclusion of all specific inclinations or purposes, the shortcoming of the optional model was the compulsion to represent the act of self-determination as a reflective choice between inclinations or impulses that are themselves beyond the subject’s control—and, as Hegel never tires of repeating, a consequence of such an incomplete definition of freedom is the Kantian dualism of duty and inclination, of ideal moral law and mere instinct-driven nature. In contrast, not surprisingly, the author of the Philosophy of Right aims at a more complex model of “free will” in which even the material of individual self-determination loses every trace of heteronomy because it can in its turn be imagined as a product of freedom. Such a demanding concept is supposed to be possible if the will is imagined as an internally reflective relationship, whereby it is able to have an effect on itself as will.