and admits of congressionally authorized exceptions. Section 411(a) thus
imposes a type of precondition to suit that supports nonjurisdictional treatment
under our precedents.” (citation omitted)). And, of course, “a party may waive or
forfeit the benefit of a nonjurisdictional rule.” Muskrat v. Deer Creek Pub. Sch.,
715 F.3d 775, 784 (10th Cir. 2013).
We conclude that David intentionally relinquished any argument
concerning the copyright registration status of the 2001 versions of BOSS and
Independence. Therefore, we deem the argument waived in the district court and
we decline to entertain it on appeal.
C
David’s third argument is that Román’s report, which was adopted in toto
by the district court, is flawed. According to David, Román’s report provides
inadequate support for its conclusions, and, in any event, Cromwell is not
substantially similar to BOSS or Independence.1
1 David also argues that Román erred by applying an insurmountable
standard for software copyright cases. Specifically, David points us to Román’s
statement that “[w]ithout identified significant portions of copied code, the
Defendants’ Pmaster software program would not function to provide a payroll
service that would meet the needs of diverse group of customers.” Aplt. App. III
at 810. This same line is echoed in the district court’s order. Id. IV at 1261
(noting parenthetically that “copying was essential to the functions of the program
itself”). “[N]early every allegedly infringing piece of software would fail the
Special Master’s test,” David says, because “[f]or most even reasonably efficient
computer programs, removal of a single line of code could result in a failure o