Yet, initial enthusiasm amongst the organizers had waned by May 1983. Two months before the first families were set to arrive; organizers at the Israel Aliya Office had already admitted defeat, deeming the summer program a failure. “I have the sense and belief that Operation 1000 1983 will bring forth the beginnings of a new way [forward] in the progress of
immigration, [as] a revolutionary project to bring families to the land . . . and there’s no doubt that this project—even if of short-duration—will make the land close to his heart,” wrote Hollander of the program, yet, he was already lowering expectations, noting “There was no chance, this year, to achieve the core goal of bringing a thousand families, and it’s a pity that
this unrealistic number was a part of the name of the program.”57 While Hollander placed special emphasis on the “distorted view of the general situation in Israel, and that of Judea and Samaria in particular, in the media of the US”,58 and primarily blamed global political and economic conditions beyond human control on low enrollment, he also criticized his
project partners for their own failures, dividing this critique into three sections: (1) programming and information, (2) management and operations, and (3) flight costs.