1 Content mistakes can also be indexed to failures to see why a particular action is wrong. For an individual may believe that an action is wrong but be mistaken with respect to which features of the behavior are relevant to its wrongness.
2 For the opposing view, see Moody-Adams (1994).
3 This belief may be relevant to an assessment of David's culpability for his own ignorance about the scope of morality. For an analysis of culpable ignorance, see Smith (1983).
4 The cognitive account also lends itself to an explanation of why so many cover-ups seem rather half-hearted. In so doing, it again betters the volitional explanation of ethical failures of leadership. Contrary to what the volitional account might predict, it seems that leaders frequently make little or no effort to conceal their ethical failings. When there is no
intricate scheme of deception to be found, we are stricken not by the rational use of the resources at their disposal but, rather, with the seemingly irrational fashion in which these resources were neglected. An appeal to mistakes of scope thus explains the near flaunting nature of many ethical failures of leadership.