there is no difficulty with this, since, ultimately, the boundaries
of the concept are not fluid. Superficial characteristics
may vary, but it is possible to map clear distinctions between
‘dog’, ‘fox’, ‘cat’ and so on (Hayakawa & Hayakawa 1990,
Gordon 1998). The problem with a word like ‘coping’ is that
it refers to an abstract idea, or more accurately, a collection
of abstract ideas, which range between the affective and the
behavioural. It is possible to make useful, meaningful,
predictive, prescriptive or other kinds of statements about
dogs because there is agreement between people as to what a
dog is (Rescher 1969; Gordon; 1998). Ultimately, a speaker
can simply point and say: ‘‘That’s what I mean by ‘dog’’’.
This process of verification by ostensive definition is not
available in abstract discourse. Concept analysis is, therefore,
the process of trying to arrive at consensus over the use of
words. It uses etymology and use to illuminate meaning, by
establishing a range for the use of the term in question
(Rescher 1969, Chomsky 1975), from the paradigmatic