Sanctions for the taking of protected species were not
imposed over most of the surveyed area during this study.
On this basis, as well as on theoretical grounds (MilnerGulland
& Leader-Williams 1992), the effectiveness of species
protection laws could be improved most dramatically
by increasing the probability that violations will be detected,
rather than by increasing penalties. In wealthier countries,
where game management is largely privately
controlled and can be supported by high levels of dedicated
manpower, enforcement is effectively achieved through a
combination of private and state policing. Policing is not
impossible in countries such as the DRC, but mechanisms
for obtaining sufficient and sustainable funding are necessary
if law enforcement is to be effective (Jachmann & Billiouw
1997). Complementary approaches, drawing on the
capacity of traditional administrations to restrict access to
markets and technology, are also being tested and have
provided encouraging results (de Merode 2004). This
points to the engagement of such community-based