There was clear evidence of a loose-coupled system
regarding the capital asset management of the NHS in
Wales. A number of departments maintained their own
records of assets and, while sometimes aware that other
registers existed, they did not integrate their information
with that available elsewhere. Each register was kept for
a specific purpose and recorded only data relevant to that
purpose. Thus, figures for the annual accounts were generated
centrally and not included as part of the internal
management accounts and the records used to report and
manage the physical state of the assets were not integrated
with the financial aspects. While the figures reported in the
annual accounts were specified centrally, ad hoc enquiries
were used when enquiring into the state of the assets
throughout Wales.
Numerous reports produced over the years up to the
present, as described in the Organisational Context section
of this paper, acknowledge the poor condition of the fabric
of the NHS in Wales. Relatively modest investment in
capital infrastructure for two decades has resulted in more
than 75% of the built estate being over 20 years old with
one in ten properties dating from before 1900 and a backlog
maintenance figure estimated at over £400 million (WAG,
2003b) Despite recognition of the importance of having the
right facilities in the right place and in good condition, both
maintenance and new build have not kept pace with identified
requirements. A large part of this might be attributed
to the limited availability of finance and the reluctance to
commit to a significant aggregate of PFI or PPP deals. However,
the elements of loose coupling identified in this study
could have also played their part to restrict change. Limited
investment has been available for capital expenditure
but this has resulted in a persistence and maintenance of
the current estate rather than replacement and disposal of
older assets Organisational stability that can result from
loose coupling where a single area can be impacted by
change without it spreading to others can result in problems
when this stability is akin to inertia and so desirable
organisational change does not occur.
It was seen that the rigidity of the information systems
to external change was partly a resistance response
available due to the loose coupling of the organisation. As
far as the Estates and Finance functions were concerned,
they were operating efficiently, but independently. They
were certainly largely unaffected in their operations and
had “absorbed” the changes without necessarily changing
their behaviour. External legitimacy was present as the two
departments appeared to comply with the requirements
to respond positively to the accounting change imposed by
government. Where they had to work together, for example
on business cases, they did so, but this was infrequently and
not in responsive manner. For example, finance asset registers
were not routinely updated when new assets were
acquired or older assets disposed of. Instead, there were
infrequent, sometimes ad hoc, routines to bring together
the two information sources. When this occurred, out of
date information was identified and corrected, but this
occurrence was exceptional rather than the norm.
In these circumstances, it was possible that strategy
delivery was suboptimal as all the ramifications of particular
approaches were not apparent or considered. In
particular, the financial consequences were not appreciated.
This effect was reinforced by the lack of delegation of
budgets for capital charges, which removed the incentive
to become involved in the financial aspects. Even if delegation
took place, there remained the need to overcome the
fact that a financial quantum attached to an asset did not
necessarily reflect its ability to deliver appropriate outputs.
The ramifications of the deficiencies of the loose coupled
systems are evidenced by the standard of the Estate of
the NHS Hospital Trusts in Wales. It has allowed a lack of
capital investment to proceed unchecked and has resulted
in an ever aging and ever deteriorating asset base to serve
the people of the nation. In other words, the accounting
change has failed due to loose coupling, supporting
the findings of Lukka (2007) and Sulaiman and Mitchell
(2005). On the other hand, loose coupling is a likely and
perhaps appropriate response to the frequent structural
changes to which the NHS has been subjected. Since devolution
a divide has opened between the English and Welsh
approaches. The former has pursued a more market orientated
strategy while the latter initially maintained the
purchaser–provider split but introduced a large number
of Local Health Boards, as purchasers, that were coterminous
with local authorities. Another reorganisation has
now taken place in Wales under which a reduced number
of LHBs and NHS Trusts work within a revised planning and
funding system that replaces the commissioning framework
and effectively marks the end of