Although couched in the usual Aesopian language of such occa- sions, the message contained in a 14 May Nhan Dan editorial
on this party conference was clear. Utilizingthe "advanta- geous))shift in the world balance of forces and supported by
"an unprecedently f i r m North Vietnam and socialist camp," the party's compatriots in the South were exhorted "to struggle.. . in the tradition of the 1941 and 1945 uprisings.. .and by all necessary forms and measures to achieve the goal of revolution.t1 This decision was implemented in the fall of 1959 and the win-- ter of 1959-1960 by sharply stepping up sabotage and terrorist operations in the South and*.bysharply increasing the flow of cadres and arms to newly activated guerrilla battalions in
South Vietnam.
Despite the claim of solid backing by the "socialist camp," t h i s new revolutionary drive was to receive much more support from Peiping than from Moscow throughout 1959. Khrushchev's decision at this time to press for a rapprochement with the
West under the guise of "peaceful coexistence" and "relaxation of international tensions" was clearly incompatible with the launching of a frontal assault on American imperialism in Viet- nam, and indeed t h e Chinese were soon t o accuse Khrushchev of being unwilling to give adequate support t o "liberation" wars. The Soviet leader's failure to mention Vietnam in a global re- view of "main problems" in East-West relations in October 1959
(despite lenghty remarks on Korea) appeared to confirm Soviet caution with regard to Vietnam's national liberation struggle.
In a speech delivered in Peiping on 30 September, North Viet- nampolitburo member Hoang Van Hoan appeared to air publicly h i s party's grievances over Soviet non-support when he point- edly confined the scope of Soviet assistance to economic aid and efforts to restore peace in Vietnam and then paid glowing tribute to Communist China's "persistent support of the Viet- namese people's resistance war" in the past and "active sup- port of Vietnam in her struggle for national reunification"
in the present.
Authoritaive party editorials in the remaining months
of 1959 continued to betray apprehension and resentment over Khrushchev's prescriptions for bloc strategy. A recurring theme in these discussions was the need to differentiate be- tween the general world situation (where some relaxation of international tension had occurred) with the situation in Laos and South Vietnam (where American imperialists were plotting war and aggression.) Of particular interest was the veiled
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