We provide next a sketch of the formal intuition and develop the complete argument in subsequent sections. Firms'outcomes are drawn from a known distribution, and a disclosure rule defines the outcomes that must be made public. A Condorcet equilibrium disclosure rule is defined such that no majority of firms' managers would be willing to change that rule to a proposed alternative. Consider an existing policy enforcing disclosures of some favorable events but not of other less favorable events. There is, in such a policy, a mass of non-disclosers who support any new policy that increases the non-disclosure market price. Such a new policy can be designed as follows: reclassify a small fraction of favorable events “disclosed” in the existing policy as
“not-disclosed” in the new policy. Because these events are favorable, the reclassification will increase the non-disclosure market price and, therefore, it will be supported by all non-disclosers in the old policy. The fact that only a small fraction of events is reclassified is key in this construction of a new policy: managers whose events have been reclassified might oppose the new policy but, because only few of them have been reclassified, they do not have the votes to overcome the preference of all non-disclosers