Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) provide sufficient conditions for a second best Pareto efficient allocation with linear commodity taxation to require efficient production when a finite set of consumers have continuous single-valued demand functions.
Diamond and Mirrlees examine a situation in which the government requires a revenue raised by taxes but lump-sum taxation, and therefore a first-best Pareto optimal allocation of resources is unavailable. However, if there are no other distortions in the economy (e.g. externalities), if firms are characterized by constant returns to scale and if the government can set the vector of indirect consumption taxes independently of production prices then it is optimal to have productive efficiency in the economy. This implies that there should be no taxes on intermediate goods and imports.
The key idea is that when the government can control all consumer prices, the producer prices are disconnected from the consumer prices and the consumption decision part of the optimal taxation problem becomes independent of the production decision