INDONESIA
Indonesia's external position is far more comfortable than it was before the Asian financial crisis. Its current account recorded an estimated surplus of 2.6% of GDP in 2006, compared with a deficit of 3% of GDP in 1996. Its foreign-exchange reserves now cover 5.2 months of imports, compared with 3.9 months before the crisis. External debt ratios have fallen dramatically. Furthermore, unlike before the crisis when the currency was pegged at an artificially high exchange rate, the exchange rate has been allowed to adjust with some freedom in recent years, meaning it is less vulnerable to speculative attack.
The caution created by the financial crisis has left the banking sector far more stable. The ratio of loans to assets has fallen considerably and borrowing in foreign currencies has been reduced, meaning there is less repayment risk associated with currency volatility.
But if Indonesia has successfully reduced macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities, it has failed to convince investors that it has repaired the cracks in its business environment that the crisis exposed. Even as recently as 2006, real investment had not returned to its pre-crisis level. Corruption is still perceived to be rife despite a high-profile crackdown, legal uncertainty is still a concern, and bureaucracy remains problematic.
There are signs that this may be beginning to change. A new investment law shows that the government is becoming more intent on making it easier to conduct business in Indonesia, and investment figures for the past two quarters have been very encouraging. One of the biggest changes for the better in Indonesia since the 1997-98 crisis has been the shift to a more democratic political system. This offers hope that governance can improve further. If political stability is maintained, Indonesia could be about to experience an investment boom that finally breathes life into the economy again.