NormativeI mplicationsI:n stitution

NormativeI mplicationsI:n stitutionaMl odifications
The prior analysis has a number of potential implications for policy. As Mark Chinen has
noted:
Perhaps game theory's greatest potential for contributing to international law is to provide
a rigorous means of describing and articulating important aspects of state interaction and
cooperation. The hope is that fully developed game theoretic models will help states design law
that creates or enhances the conditions for cooperation, if such cooperation is desirable. 9
Ther oleo fregionalo rplurilateracl ustomA. s demonstrated above, the number of states involved
in forming a particular customary rule may have a significant effect on the ability to form and
maintain a rule. As we have suggested, this effect will differ in direction, depending on the context.
Therefore, states may find that they can develop regional or other plurilateral rules of CIL
in circumstances where multilateral rules are more difficult to establish. Regional or other plurilateral
intensification of relationships, such as in the European Union or the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, may establish the conditions for greater use of custom.
Networke ffectsin institutionalismI.n ternational cooperation in different sectors may be mutually
supportive, and there may be a kind of network effect that makes each additional instance
of cooperation more attractive than it would be absent existing instances. This game-theoretic
perspective provides support for the early neofunctionalist hypotheses regarding international
economic integration and suggests the potential value of cooperation "for its own sake" or in order
to facilitate further cooperation. It also provides theoretical support for strategies of "constructive