But even here, until Sino-Soviet relation began to improve from about 1980 onwards, the Soviet leaders were anxious lest the heretical and implacable Chinese should adversely influence American attitudes towards détente. it has also been argued that an unstated reason for the Soviet Union to retain something of a numerical advantage in some of the categories of weapons agreed with the Americans in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks was to cope with the nascent and growing Chinese nuclear capabilities. From a Soviet perspective, the significance of China during the period of tripolarity may be seen in two separate phases. In the course of the first phase that lasted until 1979, the Chinese were regarded as the main source of anti-Soviet hostility, seeking to push the United State from the path of détente towards confrontation; in the second phase from 1980 until about 1987/1988, the role was reversed as Washington was cast in the role of seeking to restrain Beijing from reaching an accommodation with Moscow.