vCloud Director was developed and t

vCloud Director was developed and tested with multi-tenancy, scalability, and security concerns in mind, however, the way a solution is architected, designed and deployed can have a significant impact on the overall security of the system that is achieved.
vCloud Director does not provide non-administrator users, edge or resource clusters any direct visibility or access to system level resources, which includes physical host information such as CPU type, memory locations, physical storage locations, IP addresses or MAC addresses, and so on. However, it is possible for tenant support teams to attempt to gain access to information about the system infrastructure on which their workloads run. If granted access, this could pose serious security threats to the lower levels of the system. Also, access gained to resources that belong to another tenant, attempted privilege escalation and attempted actions, intended or not, may disrupt the overall availability and performance of the system resulting in DoS (Denial of Service) for other workloads.
Regarding overall system security, internal threats must also be considered. Other types of administrators such as system administrators, organization administrators, vCenter administrators, database administrators may attempt privilege escalation or other harmful actions. All these threats usually come from the deficiencies of the architecture, design and implementation of vCloud Director in a specific solution design.
There are other sources of external threats such as systems and users residing outside of the vCloud platform. These could include outside attackers from the Internet attempting to gain access to vCloud Director through APIs, Web Consoles, vApp transfer service and the Virtual Machine remote console.