In fact, in recent years discussion

In fact, in recent years discussions in monetary economics have often concentrated on the structure rather than the conduct of monetary policy. The notion of “central bank independence” in particular has received enormous popular attention as well as scientific support from a literature dealing with the so-called time-inconsistency problem allegedly afflicting “discretionary” arrangements in monetary policy. While the notion of central bank independence is clearly meant to capture some elements of the relation between the central bank and the state implicitly held to be essential in solving the alleged time-inconsistency problem, it is often not made clear what the crucial responsibilities of an independent central bank exactly should be, and how and to whom it should be held to account on its performance. Yet it would seem to be of little use to claim anything for “independence” as such, and it may even be positively misleading to sell independence as a free lunch when what really matters is the precise form and degree of independence.