This line of research was subsequently given a substantial boost by a pair of recent papers
by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002). These authors argue that central to
understanding each country’s political institutions is not what laws the Europeans brought, but
rather whether they themselves settled in the particular colonies. AJR (2001) argue that the
mortality of European settlers in the countries they colonized shaped their decision to settle or not.
When the Europeans settled, they brought with them the effective European institutions
constraining the executive, whereas when they did not settle, they instituted systems of arbitrary
rule and expropriation of local populations. AJR (2002) further argue that the density of non- 21
European populations in the prospective colonies shaped the European settlement patterns. When
a region was densely settled (or urbanized) by the locals, the Europeans did not settle themselves,
but rather introduced exploitative institutions. In low density areas, in contrast, they settled and
brought their institutions of limited government, thereby causing long run growth. Using this
logic, AJR (2001, 2002) argue that both settler mortality and indigenous population density in 1500
can be used as instruments for modern day political institutions constraining the executive