In fact, from the outset each of the powers not only understood tripolarity differently but they also experienced the pressures of tripolarity in different ways. This arose in part from the lack of symmetry among the three powers and in part because of the way in which domestic factors interacted with the external pressures. Thus china’s relative weakness made it court the united states in the first place against the perceived threat of the soviet union. But ideological rivalry with the soviet union which went to the heart of the legitimacy of mao and his cultural revolution intensified his hostility towards the country and, at least in the eyes of his soviet adversaries, precluded any prospect of an accommodation until his death. Thus for most of the 1970s china’s leaders sought in vain to establish an international coalition to confront the soviet union and openly derided the American development of détente with the soviet union as appeasement. The soviet leaders were so convinced that mao personally was at the heart of Chinese hostility towards them that they put out feelers towards the Chinese after mao’s death in 1976. In the event, it was not until deng Xiaoping had gained ascendancy in Beijing in late 1978 and jettisoned much of mao’s ideological legacy that china’s leaders were in position to explore the prospects for improved relations.