But the immediate effect of henry k

But the immediate effect of henry kissinger’s visit to Beijing in july 1971 was to serve china’s interest by accelerating the return of the people’s republic of china to full participatory membership of the international community. That autumn the UN general assembly voted overwhelmingly to expel the republic of china (i.e., Taiwan) and replace it with the PRC. The general trend of improving state relations with the PRC reached a high tide as nearly all states rushed to normalize relations with Beijing. But the startling diplomatic success of the Americans in establishing a strategic alignment with the Chinese, according to Kissinger’s own account, was followed not by immediate conciliatory moves by the soviet union, but by Moscow’ encouragement of india to act boldly in facilitating the break-up of Pakistan, a staunch ally of the PRC. After signing a treaty with the soviet union in august 1971, the Indian government assisted the rebellion in east Pakistan in seceding and in establishing the state of Bangladesh. According to Kissinger, only American pressure (including the so-called ‘tilt to pakistan’) prevented india with soviet connivance from proceeding to capture the whole of Kashmir and in the process destroying the remaining Pakistani army and bringing about the dismemberment of west Pakistan. That in turn would have left china vulnerable and it could possibly have undermined the Nixon/Kissinger initiative to establish a new and necessary balance of power. It is clear even from this self-serving account that the opening to china did not automatically result in more ‘restrained soviet behaviour’ and it also pointed up that the weakness of china could make it a liability for the united states under certain circumstances as well as an asset it a liability for the united states under certain circumstances as well as an asset under others.