132 The United States wasthe clear

132
The United States wasthe clear leader of NATO. But the mutual understandings and institutionalmechanisms of the alliance would reduce the implications of these asymmetries of power in its actual operation.
The security alliance also served to reduce European fears of resurgentand unbridled German military power. The strategy of tying Germany to Western Europe was consistently championed by George Kennan. In the long run there can be only three possibilities for the future of western and central Europe. One is German domination. Another is Russian domination.
The third is a federated Europe, into which the parts of Germany are absorbed but in which the influence of the other countries is sufficient to hold Germany in her place. If there is no real European federation and if Germany is restored as a strong and independent country, we must expect another attempt at German domination.
133
Two years later, Kennan was again arguing that without federation there is no adequate framework within which adequately to handle the German problem.”
134
The idea was to rebuild Germany’s economic and military capabilities within European and Atlantic institutions. This binding strategy was widely embraced at the time by American officials. Secretary of State Marshall made the point in early 1948: UnlessWestern Germany during coming year is effectively associated with Western European nations, first through economic arrangements, and ultimately perhaps in some political way, there is a real danger that whole of Germany will be drawn into the eastern orbit with dire consequences for all of us.”
135
When Secretary of State Dean Acheson went to the Senate to answer questions about the NATO treaty, Senator Claude Pepper posed the question: The Atlantic Treaty has given theseWestern European nations some confidence against a resurgent Germany as well as Russia?” Acheson replied: Yes. It works in all directions.”
136
As ColdWar tensions made western German rearmament increasingly necessary, the elaborateness of alliance restraints on German power also grew, reflected in the complicated negotiations over an inte-
grated military command and the legal agreements that accompanied the restoration of German sovereign.
137
If NATO bound both western Germany and the United States to Europe, it also reinforced British and French commitment to an open and united Europe. The United States was intent not only on the rehabilitation and reintegration of Germany; it also wanted to reorient Europe itself. In an echo of Wilson’s critique of the old politics of Europe after World War I, American officials after 1945 emphasized the need for reform of nationalist and imperialist tendencies. It was generally thought that the best way to do so was to encourage integration.
138
Regional integrationwould not only make Germany safe for Europe, it would also make Europesafe for the world. The Marshall Plan reflected this American thinking, as did Truman administration support for the Brussels Pact, the European Defense Community, and the Schuman Plan. In the negotiations over the NATO treaty in 1948, American officials made clear to the Europeans that a security commitment hinged on European movement toward integration.
One State Department official remarked that the United States would not rebuild a fire-trap.”
139
The American goal was, as Dean Acheson put it in reference to the EDC, to reverse incipientdivisive nationalist trends on the continent.”
140
American congressional support for the Marshall Plan was also premised, at least in part, on not just transferring American dollars to Europe but also on encouraging integrative political institutions and habits.